Events

Workshop Series ‘Self-Consciousness & Kinds of Self’

WORKSHOP II – 5 & 6 November
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(see also Workshop I: 8 — 9 Oct , and Workshop III: 3 — 4 December)

Organised by: Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Avenue de l’Europe 20, Switzerland

http://lettres.unifr.ch/fr/philosophie/philosophie/offredtudes.html

Co-Sponsored by: Olaf Blanke, Laboratory of Neuroscience, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

SPEAKERS
The Affective Self

  • Jan Slaby, Dept. of Philosophy, Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany
  • John Lambie, Dept. of Psychology, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK

Personal Identity

  • Eric Olson, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

The Dualistic Self

  • Martine Nida-Rümelin, Dept. of Philosophy, Fribourg University, Switzerland

Self-Knowledge in Agency

  • Lucy O’Brien, Dept. of Philosophy, University College London, London, UK

Everyone welcome | No Registration fee

All enquiries to: thomas.jacobi@unifr.ch

-> For a detailed schedule and the workshop poster, please see:
http://www.philosophie.ch/events/single.php?action=date&eventid=923&month=11&year=2012

VENUE

Salon des Professeurs, Room 2113, Misericorde, Avenue de l’Europe 20, Fribourg, Switzerland

(half-way between first & second floor, by the staircase, same level as cafeteria) http://www.unifr.ch/map/de/misericorde.php

INTRODUCTION

‘Considered as a unitary object, the self is full of apparent contradictions. It is simultaneously physical and mental, public and private, directly perceived and incorrectly imagined, universal and culture-specific’ (p. 35). ‘[These different aspects or selves] are all experienced, though perhaps not all with the same quality of consciousness. And they are all valued (…)’.

Neisser, U. (1988) Five kinds of Self-Knowledge, Phil. Psychol. 1, 35 – 59 (p. 36)

The question of what self-consciousness, and, more specifically, the sense of self might amount to has been at the very centre of inquiries into the human condition across different ages, cultures and academic disciplines. The answers that have emerged in the past not only revealed different theoretical and practical approaches towards the self, depending on what was assumed that we are aware of in self-consciousness, but also importantly indicated that, in being self-conscious, we take ourselves to be aware of sometimes radically different aspects of the self or indeed of altogether distinct selves.

In these interdisciplinary workshops that draw on sources from philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, we want to explore how self-consciousness, understood broadly, intimates to us these different aspects of the particular self or kind of self we seemingly are and how these diverse self-related elements (or ‘selves’) not only form a unified whole, if they do, but also how the related conceptions of the self integrate with our general theories and assumptions about the world.

To this end, we will be discussing, inter alia, the phenomenology of self-experience; the (dis)unity of the self; self and agency; biological & evolutionary roots of the self; the emotional/affective self; the idea of a minimal self; the self and the brain; the conceptual versus non-conceptual content of self-consciousness; the embodied self; the first-person versus third-person perspective; the psychopathology of the self; the dualistic nature of the self; the problem of self-knowledge; multi-sensory integration and body awareness; the persistence of the self through time; and prospects for a unified theory of self-consciousness and the self.

Participants in the workshops will have an opportunity to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the diverse aspects surrounding the problem of self-consciousness and the self. Being able to discuss core issues with leading experts in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience will alert participants to the challenges and opportunities in this line of research and will, furthermore, demonstrate to them theoretical and practical strategies of how successful theories of self-consciousness and the self can be formulated.

The organisers wish to acknowledge the kind support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF 101115-140203 / 1)

Turing’s 100th Birthday Party at King’s College, Cambridge — ACE2012

15th & 16th June 2012
King’s College, Cambridge

Turing’s 100th Birthday Party celebrating his life and work will be held at King’s College, Cambridge—Turing’s beloved intellectual home.

Speakers include leading broadcasters and experts on Turing, as well as members of the Turing family and others who knew him personally—pioneers of computing who worked alongside him, building and programming the first computers as well as investigating his mathematical theory of how living matter grows.

Codebreaker Jerry Roberts, one of Turing’s last surviving wartime colleagues from Station X, will give the King’s College Turing Centenary Lecture followed by a movie about the Bletchley Park codebreakers.

There will be lectures on Turing’s contributions to: the Second World War, the development of our technological society, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Life, the theory and practice of computing, and the understanding of the human mind.

Turing’s 100th Birthday Party coincides with the major Turing Centenary congress in Cambridge, allowing guests to attend both events if they wish.

For more information about the event, please go to: http://sites.google.com/site/turingace2012/

Speakers

  • Sir John Dermot Turing
  • Jon Agar
  • Margaret Boden, OBE
  • Martin Campbell-Kelly
  • Brian Carpenter
  • Jack Copeland
  • Daniel Dennett
  • Robert Doran
  • William Newman
  • Teresa Numerico
  • Brian Oakley
  • Brian Randell
  • Bernard Richards
  • Jerry Roberts
  • Simon Singh
  • Doron Swade
  • Stephen Wolfram
  • Michael Woodger

Registration

Please register early, places are limited. To register, please visit: http://sites.google.com/site/turingace2012/registration

Transport and accommodation

For information about how to arrive in King’s College, and places to stay, please visit: http://sites.google.com/site/turingace2012/hotels

Organisers

Turing 100th Birthday Party is being organised by Jack Copeland (jack.copeland@canterbury.ac.nz) and Mark Sprevak (mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk).

Workshop: Should a Science of Cognition use First-Person Methods?

Should a Science of Cognition use First-Person Methods?

 

Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tuebingen

June 15-16, 2012

Workshop: Call for commentators

 

Part of the Games of the Brain workshop series:

http://www.cin.uni-tuebingen.de/events/cin-lectures.php

 

The use of first person methods in cognitive science has followed several cycles of acceptance and rejection. Arguments both for and against their use often refer to methodological considerations: either the role of first-person methods as providing essential scientific evidence, or the inherent problems in collecting and interpreting such data.

The aim of this workshop is to focus directly on the methodological questions surrounding first-person methods, by addressing them from the different viewpoints across cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. In particular, philosophy of science offers a relatively untapped resource for investigating questions about measurement and operationalization, so has much to offer current debates on this subject.

The workshop will focus on the following sorts of questions:

 

- Are there scientific paradigms or areas of research for which first-person data is essential?

- Does first-person data differ from other scientific data? If so, how? (E.g. is it really private or incorrigible?)

- Are there specific problems associated with collecting first-person data compared with other scientific data? (E.g. response bias, demand characteristics)

- Given these problems, how should first-person data be collected and interpreted? (E.g. methods for reducing response bias, experimental design)

- What, if anything, can be learned from older debates about the use of first-person methods (e.g. against introspection)?

- Do these methodological problems raise further questions about how we should talk about first-person states? (E.g. are there phenomenal facts?)

 

Speakers:

Dr. Uljana Feest, (Technische Universitat, Berlin)

Dr. Liz Irvine, (CIN, University of Tuebingen)

Dr. Matt Longo (Birkbeck, University of London)

Prof. Tony Marcel (University of Hertfordshire)

Prof. Thomas Metzinger (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)

Prof. Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri, St. Louis)

Prof. Jonathan Schooler (University of California, Santa Barbara)

 

If you would like to give a commentary, please send a CV, and a response to the title of the workshop (max. 200 words), to firstpersonmethods@googlemail.com by March 30th.

Registration is free, but space is limited, so if you would like to attend the workshop, please also email firstpersonmethods@googlemail.com

Details of the workshop will be updated here soon: http://www.rationalagency.uni-tuebingen.de/

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