WORKSHOP II – 5 & 6 November
(see also Workshop I: 8 — 9 Oct , and Workshop III: 3 — 4 December)
Organised by: Department of Philosophy, University of Fribourg, Avenue de l’Europe 20, Switzerland
Co-Sponsored by: Olaf Blanke, Laboratory of Neuroscience, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
The Affective Self
- Jan Slaby, Dept. of Philosophy, Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany
- John Lambie, Dept. of Psychology, Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK
- Eric Olson, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
The Dualistic Self
- Martine Nida-Rümelin, Dept. of Philosophy, Fribourg University, Switzerland
Self-Knowledge in Agency
- Lucy O’Brien, Dept. of Philosophy, University College London, London, UK
Everyone welcome | No Registration fee
All enquiries to: firstname.lastname@example.org
-> For a detailed schedule and the workshop poster, please see:
Salon des Professeurs, Room 2113, Misericorde, Avenue de l’Europe 20, Fribourg, Switzerland
(half-way between first & second floor, by the staircase, same level as cafeteria) http://www.unifr.ch/map/de/misericorde.php
‘Considered as a unitary object, the self is full of apparent contradictions. It is simultaneously physical and mental, public and private, directly perceived and incorrectly imagined, universal and culture-specific’ (p. 35). ‘[These different aspects or selves] are all experienced, though perhaps not all with the same quality of consciousness. And they are all valued (…)’.
Neisser, U. (1988) Five kinds of Self-Knowledge, Phil. Psychol. 1, 35 – 59 (p. 36)
The question of what self-consciousness, and, more specifically, the sense of self might amount to has been at the very centre of inquiries into the human condition across different ages, cultures and academic disciplines. The answers that have emerged in the past not only revealed different theoretical and practical approaches towards the self, depending on what was assumed that we are aware of in self-consciousness, but also importantly indicated that, in being self-conscious, we take ourselves to be aware of sometimes radically different aspects of the self or indeed of altogether distinct selves.
In these interdisciplinary workshops that draw on sources from philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, we want to explore how self-consciousness, understood broadly, intimates to us these different aspects of the particular self or kind of self we seemingly are and how these diverse self-related elements (or ‘selves’) not only form a unified whole, if they do, but also how the related conceptions of the self integrate with our general theories and assumptions about the world.
To this end, we will be discussing, inter alia, the phenomenology of self-experience; the (dis)unity of the self; self and agency; biological & evolutionary roots of the self; the emotional/affective self; the idea of a minimal self; the self and the brain; the conceptual versus non-conceptual content of self-consciousness; the embodied self; the first-person versus third-person perspective; the psychopathology of the self; the dualistic nature of the self; the problem of self-knowledge; multi-sensory integration and body awareness; the persistence of the self through time; and prospects for a unified theory of self-consciousness and the self.
Participants in the workshops will have an opportunity to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the diverse aspects surrounding the problem of self-consciousness and the self. Being able to discuss core issues with leading experts in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience will alert participants to the challenges and opportunities in this line of research and will, furthermore, demonstrate to them theoretical and practical strategies of how successful theories of self-consciousness and the self can be formulated.
The organisers wish to acknowledge the kind support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF 101115-140203 / 1)
Social Cognition, Engagement, and the Second-Person-Perspective
May 25-27, 2012
University of Cologne (Germany)
What are the psychological processes and neural mechanisms enabling social
cognition? How might social cognition be modulated depending on whether one is
actively engaged in social interaction with someone or merely observing others
interact? What is the impact of this distinction for research methodologies in
social psychology and social neuroscience as well as for our understanding of
conditions like autism? In particular, this conference brings together experts
from various fields to promote the prospects of a second-person approach for
future research into the foundations of social cognition.
Speakers and Discussants:
- Cristina Becchio (Torino)
- Alan Costall (Portsmouth)
- Chris Frith (London)
- Uta Frith (London)
- Thomas Fuchs (Heidelberg)
- Shaun Gallagher (Memphis)
- Tobias Grossmann (Leipzig)
- Riita Hari (Helsinki)
- Günther Knoblich (Budapest)
- Agnes Kovacs (Budapest)
- Joel Krueger (Kopenhagen)
- Cade McCall (Leipzig)
- Victoria McGeer (Princeton)
- Albert Newen (Bochum)
- Vasudevi Reddy (Portsmouth)
- Erik Rietveld (Amsterdam)
- Norihiro Sadato (Tokyo)
- Leonhard Schilbach (Cologne)
- Tobias Schlicht (Bochum)
- Natalie Sebanz (Nijmegen)
- Corrado Sinigaglia (Milan)
- Nikolaus Steinbeis (Leipzig)
- Bert Timmermans (Cologne)
- Kai Vogeley (Cologne)
- Wako Yoshida (London)
Call for Posters
We invite submissions of high quality posters from any discipline on topics related to the main theme of the conference. Posters should be directly submitted in pdf format or by way of an abstract of approx. 500 words. Contact details – authors’ names, postal address, affiliation and e-mail address – should be given separately. Please submit your posters by email to ?Nike Zohm email@example.com before March 1st, 2012!
Prof. Dr. Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Dr. Leonhard Schilbach (Uniklinik Köln), Dr. Nikolaus Steinbeis (MPI for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig), Dr. Bert Timmermans (Uniklinik Köln)
Further Information: http://www.rub.de/philosophy/2ppconference
This conference is part of the research project “Being addressed as You” (http://www.rub.de/philosophy/socialcognition), funded by the Volkswagen Foundation within their funding initiative “European Platform” (http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/foerderung/herausforderungen/european-platform-for-life-sciences-mind-sciences-and-the-humanities/bewilligungen-2010.html).
May 25th and 26th, 2012
University of Edinburgh
- Theodore Sider (Cornell University)
- Carolyn Price (Open University)
- Asbjørn Steglich-Pedersen (University of Arhus)
- Stephen Grimm (Fordham University) & Kristoffer Ahlstrom (University
The idea of a teleology of inquiry is familiar to epistemologists from Aristotle’s oft-quoted opening sentence of the Metaphysics, on which “all men by nature desire knowledge.” The picture is complicated, however, as at least three distinct aims might be posited: mere knowledge (suggested by the letter of the slogan), understanding (which Aristotle takes to be knowledge of explanations), and understanding of fundamental causes and principles (which is what Aristotle is seeking in the Metaphysics). Other candidates for the aims of inquiry and cognition present themselves: mere true belief, revealing nature’s fundamental structure, fitting the world or the situation, or the promotion of our practical or pragmatic goals.
Two related sets of questions arise here: the first having to do with the very idea that inquiry and cognition (and thought more broadly) have aims, and the second having to do with the nature of these aims. This conference seeks to advance the debate on these and related questions by bringing together scholars working in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, and philosophy of mind. Questions to be considered include:
- Does cognition have an aim? What does it mean to say that cognition “aims” at something? Do mental states other than cognitive states have “aims”?
- Is it a claim about the natural history of belief and/or the biological function of belief?
- Does belief “aim at truth”? In what sense? Is the claim normative, and in what sense?
- Are there aims essential to inquiry? Or to scientific inquiry? Is there a unique aim of inquiry, or are there a plurality of aims of inquiry? Are there aims of inquiry other than truth (e.g. understanding, “carving nature at the joints,” empirical adequacy, etc.)? Are certain aims of inquiry pragmatic as opposed to properly epistemic (e.g. theoretical virtues such as simplicity, elegance, etc.)?
- Why is it appropriate to characterize inquiry as having a goal or aim? Does the fact that belief or inquiry has a certain aim explain the value of knowledge? Does this fact illuminate the nature of epistemic evaluation?
- Can metaphysical or methodological naturalists endorse a teleological conception of belief (and other mental states)? Do they or should they accept the idea that the concept of belief (or mentality in general) is normative?
Call for Papers
We invite submissions of papers for presentation at the conference on these and related topics. Send submissions (3,000 words) to firstname.lastname@example.org no later than January 1st, 2012.
Sponsored by the Scots Philosophical Association, the Mind Association, the Leverhulme Trust, and the School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences (PPLS) at the University of Edinburgh.