Events

Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Cognitive Evolution

2 years ago

by Nick Shea in Events

New Thinking: Advances in the study of human cognitive evolution

23-24 June 2011
University of Oxford

http://www.cognitiveevolution.co.uk/

Speakers:

Peter Godfrey-Smith
Kim Sterelny
Eva Jablonka
Chris Frith
Alison Gopnik
Russell Gray
Andrew Whiten
Ken Laland
Cecilia Heyes
Robin Dunbar
Louise Barrett
Robert Barton

The Metaphysics of Mind – Graduate Conference

2 years ago

by Mark Sprevak in Calls for Conference Papers, Events

Metaphysics of Mind – 2011 Centre for Perceptual Experience Graduate Conference

June 24th – 25th 2011
Glasgow

Our keynote speakers will be:

Professor E. J. Lowe (Durham) and
Professor Martine Nida-Rümelin (Fribourg)

A further 8 papers will be given by graduate speakers. These papers will cover a range of topics within the area and our contributing speakers represent an international spread of institutions.

By drawing together contemporary developments in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and with reference to developments in psychology and neuroscience, the conference aims to promote philosophical and inter-disciplinary dialogue around the central philosophical questions of mental causation and laws, mental events, perceptual experience and action.

Website: http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/philosophy/cspe/ (see Events)

To register: Please email Umut Baysan on e.baysan.1@research.gla.ac.uk

The conference is supported by: The Aristotelian Society, Scots Philosophical Association, Mind Association, and the University of Glasgow College of Arts.

Emergence and Panpsychism Conference

2 years ago

by Mark Sprevak in Events

International Conference on the Metaphysics of Consciousness

Munich, Germany

June 20th – June 24th 2011

In 1979, Thomas Nagel published a paper titled “Panpsychism”. Almost 30 years later, this paper can now be considered “visionary”: On the one hand, Nagel defends the thesis – and this hardly something completely unexpected – that classical substance-dualism faces too many conceptual problems to be a viable option when it comes to explaining the pairing of the physical and the mental. But on the other hand, he argues that non-reductive physicalism will most probably not be able to solve this problem either. An assessment that has become widely acknowledged: In 1996, David Chalmers in “The Conscious Mind” argued for this thesis and 2005 Jaegwon Kim conceded that after all non-reductive physicalism might not be true globally – it might only be true “enough”.

As an alternative, Nagel explores the possibility of brute emergence of consciousness from a purely physical base. And again 30 years later, there has been a systematic revival of the theory of emergence. Nevertheless, Nagel claims that strong emergence might be “un- intelligible”. He argues that in order to explain consciousness naturalistically, philosophers need to assume some form of the mental at the very basis of reality.

Today, panpsychism and emergence are two main options for explaining consciousness in a non-reductive, nevertheless naturalistic ontological framework. This symposium brings together distinguished experts on panpsychism and emergence in order to foster discussion on the following topics: