New Thinking: Advances in the study of human cognitive evolution
23-24 June 2011
University of Oxford
Metaphysics of Mind – 2011 Centre for Perceptual Experience Graduate Conference
June 24th – 25th 2011
Our keynote speakers will be:
- Professor E. J. Lowe (Durham) and
- Professor Martine Nida-Rümelin (Fribourg)
A further 8 papers will be given by graduate speakers. These papers will cover a range of topics within the area and our contributing speakers represent an international spread of institutions.
By drawing together contemporary developments in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and with reference to developments in psychology and neuroscience, the conference aims to promote philosophical and inter-disciplinary dialogue around the central philosophical questions of mental causation and laws, mental events, perceptual experience and action.
Website: http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/philosophy/cspe/ (see Events)
To register: Please email Umut Baysan on email@example.com
The conference is supported by: The Aristotelian Society, Scots Philosophical Association, Mind Association, and the University of Glasgow College of Arts.
International Conference on the Metaphysics of Consciousness
June 20th – June 24th 2011
In 1979, Thomas Nagel published a paper titled “Panpsychism”. Almost 30 years later, this paper can now be considered “visionary”: On the one hand, Nagel defends the thesis – and this hardly something completely unexpected – that classical substance-dualism faces too many conceptual problems to be a viable option when it comes to explaining the pairing of the physical and the mental. But on the other hand, he argues that non-reductive physicalism will most probably not be able to solve this problem either. An assessment that has become widely acknowledged: In 1996, David Chalmers in “The Conscious Mind” argued for this thesis and 2005 Jaegwon Kim conceded that after all non-reductive physicalism might not be true globally – it might only be true “enough”.
As an alternative, Nagel explores the possibility of brute emergence of consciousness from a purely physical base. And again 30 years later, there has been a systematic revival of the theory of emergence. Nevertheless, Nagel claims that strong emergence might be “un- intelligible”. He argues that in order to explain consciousness naturalistically, philosophers need to assume some form of the mental at the very basis of reality.
Today, panpsychism and emergence are two main options for explaining consciousness in a non-reductive, nevertheless naturalistic ontological framework. This symposium brings together distinguished experts on panpsychism and emergence in order to foster discussion on the following topics:
- The Case for Panpsychism and Emergence.
- The Interrelation of Panpsychism and Emergence.
- Towards an Ontological Framework for Non-reductive Naturalism.
- The Historical Background of Panpsychism
- Empirical Applications of Panpsychism
- Michael Blamauer
- Godehard Brüntrup
- David Chalmers
- Philip Clayton
- Sam Coleman
- Gernot Falkner
- Philip Goff
- Michael Hampe
- Pete Jedlicka
- Riccardo Manzotti
- Tobias Müller
- Franz Riffert
- Gregg Rosenberg
- Christina Schneider
- William Seager
- David Skrbina
- Kathrin Solhdju
- Achim Stephan
- Galen Strawson
For detailed information, please refer to: http://www.geiststaub.de/MD_2011_Munich.html