(0 comments, 5 posts)
This user hasn't shared any profile information
Posts by Liz Irvine
Workshop: Putting Dual-System Theories to the Test – Insights from Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience
January 31- February 2, 2013, Center for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, Germany
Over the past two decades, there has been a substantial increase in theoretical frameworks alluding to the existence of two different processing systems (e.g., intuition – deliberation, emotion – reason etc.), likely operating according to different rules. This workshop will put dual-system models to the test from a scientific and a philosophical perspective. The framework will be discussed with regard to (i) its neural plausibility, i.e., if, and if so how, dual-system models can be tied to current theories of brain function/mechanisms, (ii) the level of explanation, e.g., even if there were no distinct neural mechanisms, whether it may still be useful to talk of a dual-process view at the psychological level, and (iii) with regard to the methodological and conceptual clarity of the framework, e.g. whether the distinction is a clear and theoretically useful one.
14.30-16.00 Prof. Wim de Neys (Cognitive Psychology, LaPsyDE, CNRS, Universite Paris Descartes)
16.30-18.00 Prof. Keith Frankish (Philosophy of Psychology, OU/University of Crete)
09.00-10.30 Dr. Jason Alexander (Philosophy of Economics and Decision Theory, London School of Economics)
11.00-12.30 Prof. Henrik Walter (Psychiatric Neuroscience and Neuro-Philosophy, Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin)
14.00-15.30 Prof. Etienne Koechlin (Cognitive Neuroscience, DEC, ENS Paris)
16.00-17.30 Dr. Guy Kahane (Moral Psychology, University of Oxford)
09.30-11.00 Prof. Elisabeth Norman (Cognitive Psychology, University of Bergen)
11.00-13.00 General discussion
There will also be commentators for the main talks, from across philosophy, psychology, micro-economics and neuroscience. More details, workshop schedule and webpage to follow.
Registration is free, but please email firstname.lastname@example.org if you plan to attend.
Organisers: Dr. Kirsten Volz and Dr. Liz Irvine (Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Tuebingen) and Prof. Sabine Doring (Philosophy, Tuebingen).
I’m a post-doc in the Philosophy of Neuroscience group in the Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tuebingen. My general approach is to use frameworks from philosophy of science to address questions more commonly answered from the perspective of philosophy mind.
One of my interests is in how features of scientific practice affect the kind of scientific concepts we can use—in my PhD thesis I questioned whether ‘consciousness’ can be a viable scientific concept on (scientific) methodological grounds. I’m now using investigations of scientific practice within decision-making research to think about philosophical questions concerning levels, explanation, and even the aims, of at least some parts of cognitive science.
You can find more details on my research, my new book (‘Consciousness as a Scientific Concept’), as well as on interdisciplinary workshops I’m involved with, on my website.
Tübingen International Summer School (TISS) 2012: How do we make decisions? Perspectives from philosophy and science
September 24th to 27th, 2012, Cloister Heiligkreuztal http://www.kloster-heiligkreuztal.de
CAll FOR APPLICATION
The Tübingen International Summer School 2012 is a joint venture of the FORUM SCIENTIARUM and the Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience (CIN). This year’s summer school will focus on different approaches to understanding decision-making. Decision-making is currently investigated across neurobiology, neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, but what is treated as a decision, and which methods and modeling techniques are used to investigate it, are often very different. Given an introduction to state of the art research in decision-making, our central question is if, and how, we can integrate research across these fields.
Areas include: neurobiology and Bayesian models of sensori-motor decision making, neuroscience and modeling of risky decision making processes, cortical network dynamics of decision making, ‘Fast and Frugal’ heuristics, machine learning models of decision making, social decision making and models of reasoning, philosophy and methodology of neuroeconomics.
• Daniel Braun, MPI for Biological Cybernetics, Tübingen
• Roberto Fumigalli, Bayreuth University
• Stephan Hartmann, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science
• Kerstin Preuschoff, EPFL, Lausanne
• Lael Schooler, MPI for Human Development, Berlin
• Markus Siegel, CIN, Tübingen
• Liz Irvine, CIN, Tübingen
• Axel Lindner, Hertie Institute for Clinical Brain Research, Tübingen
• Kirsten Volz, CIN, Tübingen
• Hong Yu Wong, CIN, Tübingen
The summer school is aimed at advanced undergraduate students and graduate students working in neurobiology, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and other relevant disciplines.
Participants should submit a motivational letter, in English, outlining their interests in decision-making, how this relates to their current work, and what they hope to achieve from attending the summer school (500-1000 words).
An additional application form is downloadable from our website (www.forum-scientiarum.uni-tuebingen.de/summerschool) and has to be submitted with the essay. The final deadline is July 31st. Applications should be sent to email@example.com.
Should a Science of Cognition use First-Person Methods?
Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tuebingen
June 15-16, 2012
Workshop: Call for commentators
Part of the Games of the Brain workshop series:
The use of first person methods in cognitive science has followed several cycles of acceptance and rejection. Arguments both for and against their use often refer to methodological considerations: either the role of first-person methods as providing essential scientific evidence, or the inherent problems in collecting and interpreting such data.
The aim of this workshop is to focus directly on the methodological questions surrounding first-person methods, by addressing them from the different viewpoints across cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. In particular, philosophy of science offers a relatively untapped resource for investigating questions about measurement and operationalization, so has much to offer current debates on this subject.
The workshop will focus on the following sorts of questions:
- Are there scientific paradigms or areas of research for which first-person data is essential?
- Does first-person data differ from other scientific data? If so, how? (E.g. is it really private or incorrigible?)
- Are there specific problems associated with collecting first-person data compared with other scientific data? (E.g. response bias, demand characteristics)
- Given these problems, how should first-person data be collected and interpreted? (E.g. methods for reducing response bias, experimental design)
- What, if anything, can be learned from older debates about the use of first-person methods (e.g. against introspection)?
- Do these methodological problems raise further questions about how we should talk about first-person states? (E.g. are there phenomenal facts?)
Dr. Uljana Feest, (Technische Universitat, Berlin)
Dr. Liz Irvine, (CIN, University of Tuebingen)
Dr. Matt Longo (Birkbeck, University of London)
Prof. Tony Marcel (University of Hertfordshire)
Prof. Thomas Metzinger (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)
Prof. Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
Prof. Jonathan Schooler (University of California, Santa Barbara)
If you would like to give a commentary, please send a CV, and a response to the title of the workshop (max. 200 words), to firstname.lastname@example.org by March 30th.
Registration is free, but space is limited, so if you would like to attend the workshop, please also email email@example.com
Details of the workshop will be updated here soon: http://www.rationalagency.uni-tuebingen.de/
CALL FOR PAPERS: Models and Mechanisms in Cognitive Science
School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences
University of Edinburgh
29 June 2011
We invite submissions of papers by graduate students to the “Models and Mechanisms in the CogSciences” Workshop, to be held at the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh on 29 June 2011.
Papers should be approximately 4000 words in length, and may be on any topic addressing the general issue of modelling and mechanisms in the cognitive sciences. All presentations will be followed by a response, making the workshop a unique opportunity for fruitful debate and for students to get feedback on their work. Contributions are welcome from fields including philosophy, cognitive (neuro)science, informatics, and other relevant fields.
- Mark Sprevak (Cambridge/Edinburgh)
- Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg)
There is an increasing amount of interest in the distinctive role that models and mechanisms play in cognitive science (Machamer, Darden & Craver, 2001, Craver, 2007, Piccinini, 2007, Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). However, more detailed investigations are needed to track the heuristic roles of models and mechanisms, how these approaches are related, and how they contribute to questions of explanation, reduction and scientific realism in specific cases, and in the cognitive sciences more generally. This preliminary workshop aims to explore these questions through a mix of presentations and discussions, led by Stephan Hartman (Tilburg) and Mark Sprevak (Cambridge/Edinburgh). Relevant topics include the role of models in terms of their predictive or representational functions, the constraints (if any) that models of cognition must satisfy, and if there is empirical evidence to show that particular models (e.g. the Bayesian brain, Knill & Pouget, 2004) provide accurate accounts of the brain or should be viewed instrumentally. The way that models and mechanisms are related, through one-way or mutual constraints, or through a potential transition from models to mechanisms, will also be an important area of discussion. There may also be issues specific to models and mechanisms within cognitive science that affect their relationship and their impact on discussions of explanation, reduction, and realism. Examples of paper topics are listed below.
In comparison to other disciplines like physics or economics, is there anything special about modelling in cognitive neuroscience?
Do models in cognitive neuroscience serve mainly predictive purposes rather than representational functions?
What are the kind of considerations that can orient model-building in cognitive sciences? How is knowledge transferred from a model to its target?
How do models relate to mechanisms?
Under what conditions do models become mechanistic?
What are the mechanistic properties relevant to cognitive modelling?
From the use of certain types of modelling (e.g. Bayesian modelling) in neuroscience, have we learned or can we hope to learn that the brain is a certain kind of machine (e.g. a Bayesian machine)?
How do model-based or mechanism-based approaches to cognitive neuroscience affect debates over reductionism, explanation and scientific realism?
Submission deadline: March 1, 2011
Notification of acceptance: April 15, 2011
Please send the following to firstname.lastname@example.org in .doc, .rtf, or .pdf format:
1) A cover letter containing:
a) the author’s name and institutional affiliation
b) the author’s contact information
c) the title of the paper
d) word count
2) The paper itself (around 4000 words), including the title and a short abstract (no more than 200 words), and with no information identifying the author or the author’s institutional affiliation.
For further enquiries, please email email@example.com