The AHRC research project, A History of Distributed Cognition (http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk), is pleased to announce that 4 of its open web seminars are now available to view.
‘Distributed Cognition in the Analytic and Continental Traditions’ by Mike Wheeler: http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/seminars/distributed-cognition-analytic-and-continental-traditions
‘Embodied Cognition’ by Shaun Gallagher: http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/seminars/embodied-cognition
‘The Extended Mind’ by Andy Clark: http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/seminars/extended-mind
‘Enactivism’ by Dave Ward: http://www.hdc.ed.ac.uk/seminars/enactivism
There is an online discussion forum open for each seminar. To comment one only has to sign up at: https://disqus.com/ (only takes a minute). Please do feel free to comment and join in the discussion.
Further seminars, each designed to present aspects of distributed cognition with potential applications in the humanities, will follow at weekly intervals.
Special Issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology
It is generally agreed that consciousness provides subjects with an ‘outer awareness’ of their environment. More controversial is the claim that consciousness also provides subjects with an ‘inner awareness’ of their own conscious experience. Understanding the relationship between consciousness and inner awareness has increasingly been recognised as a crucial target for consciousness research. Submissions are invited for a Thematic Issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology on the subject of consciousness and inner awareness. Possible topics include, though are not limited to, the following:
1. Inner Awareness as Essential to Consciousness
Do we always have an inner awareness of our concurrent conscious state? Are there good reasons to believe that inner awareness is essential to consciousness rather than a contingent feature of our experiences? How exactly should inner awareness be characterised and what is its relationship with outer awareness? Is inner awareness a representational relation, and what would this mean for the representational structure of experience?
2. The Sense of Mineness as Essential to Inner Awareness
When we are aware of our concurrent experience, are we aware of it as our own? Are there good reasons to believe that this ‘sense of mineness’ is an essential feature of inner awareness? What exactly is the sense of mineness and how does it figure in experience? What is the relationship between the phenomenology of experiential ownership, of bodily ownership and of agential ownership?
3. Inner Awareness and Disorders of Consciousness
What can disorders of experience teach us about the relationship between consciousness and inner awareness? For instance, should ‘blindsight’ subjects be regarded as having conscious visual experiences without an inner awareness of that experience?
Dr Tom McClelland (University of Manchester)
Dr Jonathan Farrell (University of Manchester)
Prof. Uriah Kriegel (Institut Jean Nicod)
Dr. Nick Medford (University of Sussex)
Prof. Morten Overgaard (Aarhus University and Aalborg University)
Prof. Martine Nida-Rümelin (University of Friborg)
Submission Deadline: May 1st 2015
How to submit
Prospective authors should register at: http://www.editorialmanager. com/ropp to obtain a login and select “Consciousness and Inner Awareness” as an article type. Manuscripts should be approximately 8,000 words. Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the journal’s website http://www.springer.com/ philosophy/journal/13164.
For any queries, please email: jonathan.farrell@manchester. ac.uk
University of Edinburgh has just advertised two postdocs and two temporary lectureships here: http://www2.phil.cam.ac.uk/job_apps_online/
They are all 2-year positions.
The two postdocs and one of the lectureships are funded by Prof Tim Crane’s Templeton project on non-reductionist, non-physicalist approaches to consciousness and intentionality. A webpage with details of this project will be up very shortly, on http://www.timcrane.com
The closing date for applications is Monday 19 January.
Please see a new Call for Papers and Workshop Announcement on the topic of False but Useful Beliefs.
The link will take you to a webpage with details about the topic of the workshop and possible
research questions, instructions on how to submit a short paper (deadline 10th March 2015), and
background information about the project funding the workshop.
Professor of Philosophy
University of Birmingham
ASSC Satellite Workshop
4th and 5th July 2015, Paris, France
Submission deadline 1st February 2015
The sensorimotor theory claims that we can make strides toward dissolving the mysteries of consciousness if we think of experience as a kind of bodily engagement with the environment rather than something that happens only in the brain. Specifically, it claims that perceptual consciousness depends on implicit mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, the pattern-like ways that sense inputs change in line with movement by the agent or object perceived.
Since its first official statement in a seminal paper by O’Regan and Noë (2001), the theory has been extended and developed in various ways, resulting in a rich set of empirical and philosophical ideas about conscious experience. This workshop will give an overview of the state of the art and discuss key issues that a future sensorimotor theory should tackle.
The two-day workshop will feature a combination of philosophers and scientists working on the sensorimotor theory and closely related topics. Each invited talk will be accompanied by a short response, which we hope will encourage a lively and highly interactive debate.
These will be accompanied by several submitted talks of 30 minutes each including Q+A. This will be a great opportunity for researchers on sensorimotor theory from around the world to share their latest work and help progress the approach.
Call for Papers
We invite submissions engaging with one or more of the following topics:
- What kind of experimental work can we do to evaluate the role of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) in consciousness?
- How do we formalize the concept of SMCs?
- How do we account for the difference between conscious and unconscious exercise of sensorimotor mastery?
- How (if at all) can a sensorimotor approach ‘scale up’ to things like social cognition and abstract thought?
- What role do neural processes play? And how does sensorimotor theory relate to the predictive coding approach?
We also welcome contributions on other relevant topics and subtopics, which may address empirical work and/or conceptual issues.
Deadline for submissions: February 1st 2015
Notification expected by April 15th 2015
Submissions may be a maximum of 3.000 words and should be sent in .pdf or .docx format by the deadline to https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=smt20150
Format: 20-minute oral presentations (plus 10 minutes for discussion)
Everybody is welcome. Participation is free but places are limited.
Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 Rue des Saints Pères, 75006 Paris, France
For questions, please contact our ERC Lab Manager,
Niclette Bukasa Kampata at email@example.com
The workshop is being organised by David Silverman, Lucia Foglia and Jan Degenaar as part of Kevin O’Regan’s ERC Advanced Project FEEL, which is based at the Psychology of Perception Lab, Paris Descartes University.
Deadline for submissions: 15th January 2015.
Workshop: 23rd-24th April 2015 @ UNED, Madrid
The Research Workshop on Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Science (PBCS) aims at bringing together researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds: philosophers, cognitive scientists and biologists, working on issues of common interest. In its fifth edition, the organizers would like to keep encouraging young researchers to participate in this fresh and distinctive forum through a call for papers.
This call is addressed to graduate, master, Ph.D. students, as well as Doctors who finished their dissertations during the last three years, working on the areas of Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Science.
Topic: The research workshop will focus on the relationship between life and cognition. This tries to bring to light philosophical debates regarding (but not limited to): enactive approaches to biology and cognition, conceptions of life, philosophy of functions, cognition and adaptation, natural kinds, minimal requirements for either life or cognition, ecological approaches to psychology, systemic theories, biological basis of cognitive systems, etc…
Submissions: Applicants must send a detailed summary of the talk (up to 1000 words) in .doc or .pdf format. Summaries are expected to indicate the title of the talk and also highlight the relevance of the topic for the event and a sketch of the main arguments. They can be written in English or Spanish. Applicants must send two copies of the summary: one will contain the name(s) of the author(s), affiliation(s) and email contact. The second one will not include names, affiliations, email contact or any kind of information that could reveal the authorship of the document. Submissions should be sent to workshop.pbcs[at]gmail.com by 15th January 2015. Applicants will receive an answer by 15th February, 2015.
Talks: Each talk will last no more than 30-35 minutes followed by a 10-15 minutes discussion.
Invited speakers: Glenda Satne (CFS – U. Copenhagen) & Xabier Barandiarán (IAS Research – UPV)
Scientific committee: Mª J. Frápoli (UGR), Pepa Toribio (ICREA – LOGOS), Matteo Mossío (CNRS), Dave Ward (University of Edimburgh) & Laura Nuño (KLI)
Organizing committee: Manuel Heras Escribano (UGR), Cristian Saborido (UNED) & Víctor M. Verdejo (UCL).
Local committee at UNED: Javier González de Prado, Susana Monsó, Marco A. Joven & Alex Díaz.
More information will be available soon at http://pbcs5.wordpress.com.
COMPUTERS AND MINDS
The Human Mind Project
University of Edinburgh, Friday 21 November, 2014
Andy Clark (Edinburgh)
Frances Egan (Rutgers)
Anil Seth (Sussex)
Murray Shanahan (Imperial College London)
Aaron Sloman (Birmingham)
Sethu Vijayakumar (Edinburgh)
The next public event of The Human Mind Project will take place in Edinburgh as part of Being Human, the UK’s first national festival of the humanities. “Computers and Minds” will bring together leading academics to discuss the current state of the art of research at the interface of philosophy, computational neuroscience, robotics and artificial intelligence. The one-day event will feature a specialist workshop with talks by leading academics on computational theories of mind, the cognitive neuroscience of self-consciousness and body awareness, and the implications of the latest advances in artificial intelligence for understanding the human mind. The workshop will be followed in the early evening by a public event, with a presentation and demonstration on robotics by Sethu Vijayakumar and a lecture by Andy Clark entitled “Being and Computing: Are You Your Brain, and Is Your Brain a Computer?”
The Human Mind Project highlights the contribution of the arts and humanities to the study of human nature, and the importance of a comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach to understanding the mind, integrating science and the humanities.
Registration and Scientific Organization
Attendance is free of charge, but space is limited. Please visit the event page on the website of Being Human and register on Eventbrite:
This conference is sponsored by The Human Mind Project and organized by Mattia Gallotti (University of London) and Sanjay Modgil (King’s College London). For further information, contact firstname.lastname@example.org.
CALL FOR POSTERS AND FLASH TALKS – Extended submissions deadline: November 1
Reciprocity and Social Cognition Symposium
Berlin School of Mind and Brain, 23rd-25th March 2015
Submissions close: November 1, 2014
Notifications sent: November 15, 2014
For more details, please see our website:
The Berlin School of Mind and Brain is pleased to announce the Reciprocity and Social Cognition interdisciplinary symposium, to be held at the Berlin School of Mind and Brain from the 23rd to 25th March, 2015.
Reciprocity is a common feature of much social cognition. It is what separates a case in which two people attend to the same object simultaneously from a case of genuine joint attention; and what separates a case in which two people act in parallel from a case of genuine joint action. However, traditional accounts of the foundations of social cognition have underplayed the existence of reciprocity and treated social cognition as a process that rests on observation and not genuine interaction. We are holding a three-day workshop to come to better understand the notion of reciprocity and to explore how the notion of reciprocity can be used to illuminate debates in adjacent fields of social cognition.
Confirmed keynotes are Richard Moran (Philosophy, Harvard), Julia Fischer (Cognitive Ethology, Göttingen) and Natalie Sebanz (Cognitive Science, CEU Budapest). Other confirmed participants include Elisabeth Pacherie (Philosophy, Institut Jean Nicod), Henrike Moll (Psychology, Southern California), Stephen Butterfill (Philosophy, Warwick) and Isabel Dziobek (Neuroscience, HU Berlin).
The workshop is organised around six related symposia:
(1) Intentional communication,
(2) The neuroscience of dialogue,
(3) Socio-cognitive disorders,
(4) Social exchange: insights from computational neuroscience,
(5) Perspective-taking, and
(6) Joint action.
We welcome submissions for poster presentations on any of the six topics listed above. Submissions from all fields of empirical and theoretical cognitive science are encouraged. In place of poster submissions, philosophers should consider submitting short ‘flash’ talks (of around seven minutes or ten .ppt slides in length). We are looking forward to welcoming you in Berlin!
This is to announce the launch of NorMind, the Nordic Network for Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Our website is at normind.org.
NorMind is, as you might have guessed, modelled on your own MindNetwork. Our aim is to foster a stronger community of philosphers of mind and cognitive science working in the Nordic Countries (and nearby).
In the future, we hope to hold some joint meetings with MindNet.
Saturday 4 October 2014
The 10th Mind Network workshop will take place at the University of York.
The speakers are:
Dominic Gregory (University of Sheffield)
Maja Spener (University of Birmingham)
Robbie Williams (University of Leeds)
Dominic Gregory: Perception and imagery
Maja Spener: Abilities and the nature of perception
Robbie Williams: Representations of an external world
This talk will look at an underdiscussed challenge to Radical Interpretation (construed as a metaphysical story about the foundations of intentionality). The challenge is mentioned in passing in Lewis’s “New work for a theory of universals” and recently re-presented by Brian Weatherson. The upshot threatens to be this: if two possibilities are evidentially and agentially the same for a subject, then the subject cannot represent the difference between the two. But many pairs of possibilities we do distinguish may satisfy the antecedent: sceptical and non-sceptical scenarios, roughly. This is a kind of Berkleyian representational scepticism. I look at responses available to the radical interpreter, and argue that many are mere verbal victories, and don’t address the underlying sceptical challenge.
It is free to attend the meeting, but please contact the local organiser below to register your place. For details and the schedule of the meeting, please see http://on.fb.me/1rz5MpC
The local organiser is: