Call for Chapters: Machine Medical Ethics, Edited Collection, 2014
You are warmly invited to submit your research chapter for possible inclusion in an edited collection entitled Machine Medical Ethics. Target publication date: 2014.
The new field of Artificial Intelligence called Machine Ethics is concerned with ensuring that the behaviour of machines towards human users and other machines is ethical. This unique edited collection aims to provide an interdisciplinary platform for researchers in this field to present new research and developments in Machine Medical Ethics. Areas of interest for this edited collection include, but are not limited to, the following topics:
What is medical ethics?
What is machine medical ethics?
What are the consequences of creating or not creating ethical medical machines?
Can medical machines be autonomous?
Ought medical machines to operate autonomously, or under (complete or partial) human physician control?
Theories of Machine Medical Ethics
What theories of machine medical ethics are most theoretically plausible and most empirically supported?
Ought machine medical ethics be rule-based (top-down), case- based (bottom-up), or a hybrid view of both top-down and bottom-up?
Is an interdisciplinary approach suited to designing a machine medical ethical theory? (e.g., collaboration between philosophy, psychology, AI, computational neuroscience…)
Medical Machine Training
What does ethical training for medical machines consist in: ethical principles, ethical theories, or ethical skills? Is a hybrid approach best?
What training regimes currently tested and/or used are most successful?
Can ethically trained medical machines become unethical?
Can a medical machine learn empathy (caring) and skills relevant to the patient-physician relationship?
Can a medical machine learn to give an apology for a medical error?
Ought medical machines to be trained to detect and respond to patient embarrassment and/or issues of patient privacy? What social norms are relevant for training?
Ought medical machines to be trained to show sensitivity to gender, cultural and age-differences?
Ought machines to teach medicine and medical ethics to human medical students?
What role ought imitation or mimicry to play in the patient-machine-physician relationship?
What role ought empathy or caring to play in the patient-machine-physician relationship?
What skills are necessary to maintain a good patient-machine-physician relationship?
Ought medical machines be able to detect patient fakery and malingering?
Under what conditions ought medical machines to operate with a nurse?
In what circumstances should a machine physician consult with human or other machine physicians regarding patient assessment or diagnosis?
Medical Machine Physical Appearance
Is there a correlation between physical appearance and physician trustworthiness?
Ought medical machines to appear human or non-human?
Is a highly plastic human-like face essential to medical machines? Or, is a static face sufficient?
What specific morphological facial features ought medical machines to have?
Ought medical machines to be gendered or androgynous?
Ought medical machines to possess a human-like body with mobile limbs?
What vocal characteristics ought medical machines to have?
As a new field, the target audiences are expected to be from the scientists, researchers, and practitioners working in the field of machine ethics and medical ethics. The target audience will also include various stakeholders, like academics, research institutes, and individuals interested in this field, and the huge audience in the public sector comprising health service providers, government agencies, ministries, education institutions, social service providers and other types of government, commercial and not-for-profit agencies.
Please indicate your intention to submit your full paper by email to the editor who emails you with the title of the paper, authors, and abstract. The full manuscript, as PDF file, should be emailed to that same editor by the deadline indicated below. Authoring guidelines will be mailed to you after we receive your letter of intent.
Please feel free to contact the editors, Simon van Rysewyk or Dr. Matthijs Pontier, if you have any questions or concerns. Many thanks!
Intent to Submit: June 10, 2013
Full Version: October 20, 2013
Decision Date: November 10, 2013
Final Version: December 31, 2013
Simon van Rysewyk
School of Humanities
University of Tasmania
Private Bag 41
Dr. Matthijs Pontier
The Centre for Advanced Media Research (CAMeRA)
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
1081 HV Amsterdam
Call for Posters
Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems – International Conference at the University of Stuttgart
Organizer: Prof. Dr. Catrin Misselhorn
Date: July 22-24, 2013
Location: Internationale Begnungsstätte Eulenhof, Robert-Leicht-Str. 161, 70569 Stuttgart
Deadline: June 1
The Institute of Philosophy and the SimTech Cluster of Excellence at the University of Stuttgart invite doctoral and early career researchers to submit posters for presentation at the Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems conference to be held at the University of Stuttgart between 22nd and 24th July 2013.
We are pleased to be able to offer four bursaries (up to 200 € for travel plus accommodation and conference dinner) to doctoral and early career researchers who have submitted their doctoral thesis within the last two years.
To apply please submit an abstract of no more than 500 words to Prof. Dr. Catrin Misselhorn (email@example.com) by June 1st.
For more information please visit the conference website:
Registration and contact: Prof. Dr. Catrin Misselhorn (firstname.lastname@example.org).
This is the first of two invite-only workshops on the topic of ‘Extended Knowledge’. The aim is to provide, for the very first time, a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which we could conceive of knowledge as extended. This topography will provide the essential groundwork for the more specific research questions to be tackled in the future (for more info on the research objectives of the ‘Extended Knowledge’ Project, click here).
The invited speakers for this first workshop on ‘Extended Knowledge’ are: Prof. Declan Smithies (Ohio), Dr. Cathal O’Madagain (Dublin), Prof. Peter J. Graham (California, Riverside), Prof. Robert K. Logan (Toronto), Prof. Deborah Tollefsen (Memphis).
- Richard Stöckle-Schobel: Social Externalism in Concept Learning
Abstract: I want to propose that conventional theories of concept learning overlook an important aspect of cognitive development – the social framework in which a large chunk of it happens. Specifically, I will show that work in social cognition supports learning mechanisms, which are not covered by models that take perceptual categorisation as the paradigm for learning. I will use a Sellarsian social externalist framework and I will argue that a Sellarsian view implies that large parts of mindful activity are inherently social. This means that the contents and categories of concepts are established by a language community and shared in the ‘logical space of reasons’. To finish, I will show that a social externalist view like Sellars’s might be necessary to underpin an explanation of learning in terms of the results from social cognition research.
- Declan Smithies: Epistemic Internalism and the Extended Mind
- Cathal O’Madagain (tbc)
- Peter Graham: The Reliability of Testimony and Social Norms
Abstract: Testimonial warrant depends on the reliability of testimony, and so the information processing and transmitting capacities of other people. What explains why the communication channel reliably transmits accurate information? What causal structure underlies and explains its effectiveness? I explain how pro-social, cooperative social norms of informative truth-telling causally underwrite the reliability of testimony.
- Kevin Ryan: Social Externalism in Concept Learning
Abstract: The contemporary approaches to cognition as an embedded, embodied, extended, and enactive phenomenon have led to several integral debates about content and vehicle externalism at the core of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. While generally presented together under the banner of “4E cognition”, recent exchanges between theoreticians point to both continued convergence as well as growing points of disagreement in the future. The purpose of this paper is to examine one particular debate between defenders of extended and enactive approaches regarding the standing of “extended functionalism” vis-a-vis the extended mind hypothesis. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I shall introduce several background presuppositions in both the extended and life/mind enactive camps to clarify the stakes in the debate about extended functionalism. Second, I shall offer a rejoinder to several enactivist critiques of extended functionalism. While work remains to be done on clarifying the role of extended functionalism in an externalist account of cognitive processes, I suggest that it remains a useful, and perhaps necessary, part of the externalist story.
- Timothy Kunke: Extra-Personal Mental States
Abstract: Externalist approaches to mental content have already succeeded in blurring the line between the “internal” and the “external”. Standard content externalism says that the individualistic properties of the subject are not always sufficient to determine the content of certain concepts or de dicto attitudes. Recent authors, such as Timothy Williamson have argued for an even more radical externalism by claiming that factive attitudes (e.g. seeing that P) cannot be factored into internal and external components. They are prime conditions (i.e. non-compositional). For Williamson, there is no non-factive mental core to such attitudes rather factive attitudes are sui generis mental states that necessarily involve the environment. Given Williamson’s account, it could be argued that if having a factive attitude to a proposition is a mental state (as Williamson suggests), then some mental states are not necessarily states strictly of the individual subject, but of a subject-environment-compound. In this paper I will pose the following question and suggest a possible answer: How should we understand multiple subject knowledge attributions like ‘They know that P’ or ‘We know that P’ in light of Williamson’s externalist account of factive attitudes? I will sketch two cases that I call “the classroom case” and “the executive assistant case” that indicate the possibility of collective, or extra-personal mental states.
- Deborah Tollefsen: The Role of the Spokesperson in Group Testimony
Abstract: We learn things from groups. Consider the knowledge we receive from research teams, subcommittees, and expert panels. How are we to understand the testimonial relation involved in these sorts of cases? Are we learning from a particular individual within the group or is the group, itself, the source of testimony? In “Group Testimony” (2007) and elsewhere (2009, 2011) I argue that groups are sometimes the source of testimony. In this paper, I further develop this line of reasoning by focusing on the role of the spokesperson in cases of group testimony.
- Robert Logan: McLuhan Extended and the Extended Mind Thesis
Abstract: We develop complementary connections between McLuhan’s media ecology notion of media as ‘extensions of man’ and the Extended Mind Thesis of Andy Clark.
Please note that the workshop (including lunches and a hot dinner buffet) is free and everyone is welcome to attend. All attendees, however, should register in advance by visiting the following address:
The closing date for registrations is on June 1 2013.
For more information on the Extended Knowledge Project as well as on the second workshop on ‘Extended Knowledge’ you can visit the project’s website at http://www.extended-knowledge.ppls.ed.ac.uk/
Experimental Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind and Action
4th Workshop of the Experimental Philosophy Group UK,
12-13 September 2013, Wills Memorial Building, University of Bristol
Deadline for Submission: 5th July 2013
Experimental Philosophy Group UK invites the submission of 500-word abstracts for 45-minute presentations or poster presentations on ‘Experimental Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind and Action’ for their upcoming workshop. Keynote presentations will be given by Natalie Gold (KCL), James Moore (Goldsmiths), Regina Rini (Oxford) and Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside).
We welcome submissions presenting recently completed experimental work, engaging with the work of any of this year’s keynote speakers, proposing new experimental work, discussing existing empirical studies in the fields of Philosophy of Mind and Action, introducing novel approaches in this area or raising relevant methodological questions.
All high-quality submissions considered. Submissions encouraged from all levels of academia. 500-word abstracts to be sent as PDF or Word documents to email@example.com by 5th July 2013. Subject line of email should read “SUBMISSION [YOUR NAME]”. In the body of the email please state your name, affiliation and in which category (presentation or poster) you wish your submission to be considered. Submissions for presentations that are unsuccessful will be automatically considered for poster presentation. Presenters should be prepared to obtain funding from their home department, or to fund themselves.
Experimental Philosophy Group UK aims to provide a forum for UK-based researchers from all disciplines who are engaged in or interested in the investigation of philosophical topics using empirical methods. This workshop will have a focus upon (i) providing a platform for UK-based experimental philosophers, (ii) providing a forum for constructive discussion and collaboration to help and encourage new experimental work, (iii) encouraging constructive debate about the relevance of empirical findings to the philosophical study of Mind and Action.
Workshop Organisers: Bryony Pierce (Bristol), Robin Scaife (Sheffield) and James Andow (Nottingham)
We are grateful for the generous support of the University of Bristol Philosophy Department, a Mind Association Major Conference grant and the University of Bristol Centre for Science and Philosophy.
Workshop on Questions of “Cognitive Ontology”: The Impact of Neuroscience on Psychological Categories
June 22-23, 2013
What impact might neuroscience—and neuroimaging in particular—have on the categories that should be employed in psychological theorizing? Can neuroscience indicate that certain kinds of concepts should be eliminated from psychological theorizing? Might neuroscience provide us with the means to construct novel psychological categories? Is this a new route to eliminativism about folk psychological categories? The aim of this workshop is to address these and other questions that lie at the interface between neuroscience, psychology, and the philosophy of mind.
Venue: International Anthony Burgess Foundation (Manchester)
Organizers: Tim Bayne (Manchester University) & Nicholas Shea (King’s College London)
Michael Anderson (Franklin & Marshall)
Rick Cooper (Birkbeck)
Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)
Tim Shallice (Trieste International School of Advanced Studies and UCL)
Russell Poldrack (University of Texas at Austin)
For more information, see: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/philosophy/events/cognitiveontology/
Contact Tim Bayne for more details.
The Architecture of Consciousness is a five-year European Research Council (ERC) funded project which aims to develop a model of the structural features of consciousness. The project will focus on the following aspects of consciousness: its subjectivity, its temporality, its unity, its selectivity, and its dimensionality (that is, the relationship between the various levels of consciousness). By developing a model of the structural features of consciousness, the project aims to bridge the gap between raw data on the one hand and a full-blown theory of consciousness on the other. Regular workshops will be held on project themes, details of which will be posted on this site.
The project is directed by Prof. Tim Bayne, and will involve a number of post-doctoral fellows. The first two-doctoral positions will begin in September 2013.
For further information about the project please contact Tim Bayne (firstname.lastname@example.org).
Registration is open for our Annual Conference in Bristol on 6-8 September 2013: http://cep.yolasite.com/registration.php
There is still time to submit an abstract. Submissions deadline: 1 May
Further details here: http://cep.bps.org.uk/cep
The Centre for Philosophical Psychology of the University of Antwerp invites applications for the
with Professor Michael Bratman
24th & 25th August 2013
University of Antwerp
INVITED SPEAKER : Professor Michael Bratman (Stanford University)
CALL FOR PAPERS
Postgraduates in philosophy or other related disciplines, are invited to apply. Contributions addressing issues related, but not limited, to the topic of the Masterclass are encouraged. A limited number of high-quality papers will be selected for presentation at the Masterclass.
Please send an abstract (maximum 500 words) prepared for blind-review. The reviewing process will be managed through the EasyChair Conference System: https://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=ia2013
DEADLINE for submissions: 15th April 2013.
NOTIFICATION of acceptance: 30th April 2013.
Limited funds may be available to cover the travel expenses of successful candidates.
Attendance is free but due to limited space registration is required. Send an email to Angelica.Kaufmann@ua.ac.be
Organized by Angelica Kaufmann and Jens van ‘t Klooster
Starting with his groundbreaking ‘Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason’ (1987), Michael Bratman has made highly influential contributions to topics such as agency, planning, intention and moral responsibility. His work has been influential in various areas of scientific research ranging from artificial intelligence to the social sciences. Bratman is also a pioneer in the investigation of collective intentionality. In his new book ‘Shared Agency’, he outlines how his planning theory of individual agency can be used to provide the basis for an account of shared agency:
Bratman’s book “seeks a framework for understanding these basic forms of sociality: What concepts do we need? In what do these forms of sociality consist? How are they related to relevant forms of individual agency? What norms are central to such sociality? How are these social norms related to norms that apply in the first instance to individual agency? These are questions about the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of our sociality. And a conjecture of this book is that a rich account of individual planning agency facilitates the step to these forms of sociality. There is independent reason – grounded in the diachronic organization of our temporally extended agency – to see planning structures as basic to our individual agency. And once these planning structures are on board we can expect them to play central roles in our sociality. The planning theory of individual agency highlights distinctive roles and norms of intentions, understood as plan states. And the conjecture is that appeal to these planning structures enables us to provide adequate resources – conceptual, metaphysical and normative – for an account of sufficient conditions for these basic forms of sociality. Shared agency emerges, both functionally and rationally, from structures of interconnected planning agency. This is a deep continuity between individual and social agency. And this is an aspect of the fecundity of planning structures, the idea that planning structures ground a range of practical capacities that are central to our lives.”
(Bratman, M., forthcoming, Shared Agency, Oxford University Press)
The Extended Knowledge Project is a major three-year programme of research at the University of Edinburgh. It will for the first time offer a systematic exploration of the various different ways of ‘externalising’ knowledge, one which draws on cutting-edge research in epistemology and the philosophy of mind and cognition. It will then build on this systematic exploration to offer a new perspective on two particularly significant ways in which knowledge could be thought to be ‘extended’–viz., the extended cognition and distributed cognition research programmes as they apply to knowledge. In both cases the result is a form of extended knowledge, where what is unique to the latter is that the extension in question is distinctively social. The project will help establish an international network of around fifty researchers, including both established and early career. It will also draw on the unique research strengths in the University of Edinburgh, not only within Philosophy in the areas of epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science, but also within the School of Philosophy, Psychology & Language Sciences and the neighbouring School of Informatics in the area of cognitive science.
To find out more about the project, its research outputs, relevant events and bibliography, and post your own comments on the blog, you can now visit the Extended Knowledge Project Website.
The project is hosted by the Eidyn research centre.